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Perceived Price Complexity of Dynamic Energy Tariffs:  
An Investigation of Antecedents and Consequences 
 
 
Abstract 
Dynamic tariffs have the potential to contribute to a successful shift from conventional to 
renewable energies but tapping this potential in Europe ultimately depends on residential 
consumers selecting them. This study proposes and finds that consumer reactions to dynamic 
tariffs depend on the level of perceived price complexity which represents the cognitive effort 
consumers must engage in to compute the overall bill amount. An online experiment 
conducted with a representative sample of 664 German residential energy consumers 
examines how salient characteristics of dynamic tariffs contribute to perceived price 
complexity. Subsequently, a structural equation model (SEM) reveals that the depth of 
information processing is central to understand how price complexity relates to consumers’ 
behavioral intentions.   
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1. Introduction 
In response to climate change, many national governments have started to shift electricity 
generation from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources (RES) or nuclear power (EC, 2010, 
Mills and Schleich, 2012). These efforts have been reinforced by the 2015 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Paris on which large parts of the world have implicitly 
committed to an almost carbon-free electricity generation by the mid of this century. 
However, the euphoria about this remarkable multilateral achievement cannot hide the fact 
that the decarbonization of the electricity system is and will continue to be a challenging 
endeavor for energy providers, policymakers, and the society as a whole.  
The feed-in of RES-based technologies occur mainly on decentralized grid levels and, in the 
case of photovoltaic and wind, the controllability of feed-in is limited to the largely inefficient 
curtailment (Loisel et al., 2010). Hence, if no unexpected leaps in storage technologies and 
electricity exchange with neighboring countries occur, decarbonization processes will rely on 
increased demand-side flexibility (Breukers et al., 2011; Grünewald et al., 2015). One 
promising way to achieve this flexibility at relatively low cost is by means of dynamic tariffs 
(Grünewald et al., 2015; Roscoe and Ault, 2010). In dynamic tariff schemes, residential 
consumers pay different prices per kWh, depending on the time of use and/or on the current 
load at household level (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013). In contrast, static tariffs consist of a fixed 
connection charge per time period and one consumption-dependent charge per kWh, resulting 
in peak demand to be relatively underpriced (Hall et al. 2016; Simshauser and Downer, 2014). 
The idea is that dynamic tariffs financially incentivize consumers to react to the status of the 
electricity system by shifting consumption from peak to non-peak periods of the residual load, 
hereby supporting the integration of RES (Darby and Pisica, 2013; Dupont et al., 2014; 
Grünewald et al., 2015). Data from field tests conducted mainly in the US confirms that 
dynamic tariffs can lead to substantial peak load reductions (e.g., Faruqui and Sergici, 2010).  
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Given this evident potential, European politics and lawmakers are generally supportive of 
dynamic electricity tariffs. For example, German law requires power suppliers to offer at least 
one dynamic tariff (EnWG §40), and the European Commission strongly recommends their 
application (EC, COM(2015) 339 final). The key difference to the US legislation is that, in 
most European countries, dynamic tariffs are not provided by default but only as an opt-in 
option (Faruqui et al., 2010). Unlike in the US, the potential of dynamic tariffs to contribute to 
a successful decarbonization in Europe ultimately depends on residential consumers selecting 
them (Salies, 2013).  
Unfortunately, prior literature on demand side management (DSM) suggests that consumers 
show adverse reactions to the inherent complexity of dynamic tariffs (e.g., Breukers and 
Mourik, 2013; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Gordon et al. 2006; Stenner et al., 2015). For 
example, Dütschke and Paetz (2013) note that “consumers are open to dynamic prices, but 
prefer simple programs to complex and highly dynamic ones” (p. 226). In a similar vein, 
Dupont et al. (2014) stress the importance of “social acceptability” and conclude that “a tariff 
should be simple” (p. 346). While there is apparently consensus on this general notion, very 
little is known about the underlying process by which consumers evaluate dynamic tariffs, 
and the role complexity plays in it. A profound understanding of these processes is crucial to 
design dynamic tariffs that overcome the conflict between supply-demand balancing and 
consumer acceptance.  
The overarching goal of this study is to close this research gap and to examine antecedents 
and consequences of consumers’ perceived price complexity of dynamic tariffs. In order to do 
so, we draw on research in the domains of marketing, especially behavioral pricing, and 
psychology. In line with Homburg et al. (2014), we define price complexity as the extent to 
which a price or tariff1 poses a high cognitive burden on the consumer in his/her effort to 
                                                          
1 We use the terms price and tariff interchangeably throughout this article. 
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make sense of the price components and to mathematically arrive at the final bill amount. The 
term “cognitive burden” has a negative valence, reflecting the common conception that 
consumers are cognitive misers who naturally avoid their limited information-processing 
resources to be exploited (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Miller, 1956).    
Based on our conceptualization, all prices that consumers are confronted with are perceived as 
complex to a certain degree. Most prices in everyday shopping situations (e.g., for consumer 
goods) have low levels of inherent complexity because they involve one single number and, at 
most, an additional discount to take into account. However, we expect dynamic tariffs to be 
perceived as relatively complex by nature because determining the correct bill amount 
requires consumers to apply different mathematical operations, for example, multiplying 
consumption-dependent price components with anticipated consumption, adding the resulting 
values together, etc. (Homburg et al., 2014). All these operations should contribute to a 
relatively high cognitive burden and hence perceived price complexity.  
The pricing literature supports the initial findings in the realm of DSM with regard to 
consumer reactions to complex tariffs. For example, in an influential article, Lambrecht and 
Skiera (2006) examine tariffs of internet service providers and find evidence that many 
consumers choose flat-rate tariffs over pay-per-use tariffs even if the pay-per-use tariff is 
economically favorable. In fact, in service industry practice, there is a trend towards simple 
flat-rate tariffs (e.g., for mobile phone, internet or health club services) in which no 
mathematical operations are necessary. As dynamic tariffs imply the exact opposite, it is 
critical to examine the level of price complexity that consumers associate with salient aspects 
of dynamic tariffs. A review of actual tariffs suggests that dynamic tariffs not only have 
varying numbers of price components, but they also typically include a discount for new 
customers, and frequently use odd numbers that are more difficult to process. This leads to the 
first research question: 
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RQ1: To what extent do these characteristics of dynamic tariffs lead to perceived price 
complexity? 
Furthermore, our research seeks to illuminate the process by which perceived price 
complexity leads to behavioral reactions. We start with the observation that, from a consumer 
standpoint, energy represents a domain that is highly relevant for every household but 
typically evokes only little consumer awareness or involvement (Fischer, 2008; Hargreaves et 
al., 2010). In this context, consumers likely not only differ in their cognitive ability but also in 
their motivation to engage in the cognitive effort that a high price complexity implies. To the 
best of our knowledge, prior research on price complexity has neglected the focal context. 
The absence of motivation and/or ability typically decreases the depth of information 
processing, that is, consumers base the tariff evaluation on simple heuristics (e.g., Chaiken et 
al., 1989; Haugtvedt et al., 1992). Prior pricing research suggests that relying on heuristics can 
substantially distort consumer price evaluations (Morwitz et al., 1998), but research in the 
realm of dynamic electricity tariffs is lacking. This leads to our second research question: 
RQ2: (a) How does perceived price complexity affect the depth of information processing, 
and (b) how does the depth of information processing in turn affect behavioral intentions to 
select a dynamic tariff? 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief 
review of the literature on consumer reactions to dynamic energy tariffs and the role of 
dynamic tariffs for DSM. Subsequently, we develop our conceptual model and hypotheses. It 
is a process model, covering antecedents and consequences of perceived price complexity. 
Sections 4 and 5 provide an outline of our method and analytic procedure, as well as the 
results and a discussion. Last, we elaborate on contributions and implications and provide 
avenues for further research.   
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2. Literature Review 
As prior research discusses (e.g., Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Faruqui et al., 2010), the 
literature on dynamic tariffs distinguishes three major types of dynamic tariffs: time-of-use 
(TOU), critical peak pricing (CPP), and real time pricing (RTP). TOU tariffs are considered 
the least dynamic of the dynamic tariffs. They usually consist of a connection charge and 
consumption-dependent charges under a fixed timetable for a long period. CPP tariffs include 
extraordinary events or interruptible rates which penalize customers heavily for consumption 
during critical peak periods. RTP tariffs are considered most dynamic with charges following 
actual market prices. Note that different combinations of these characteristics are possible 
(e.g., Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Fell et al., 2015). 
Research on these dynamic tariffs can be ascribed to two major research streams: (1) research 
on the effectiveness of dynamic tariffs as a strategy to reduce peak demand in the realm of 
DSM, and (2) research on consumer acceptance of dynamic tariffs. With regard to the former, 
research seeks to illuminate which tariffs, and to what extent, are effective in reducing peak 
demand. Whereas initial research finds that price elasticity is “fairly low” for private 
consumers (Lijesen, 2007, p. 249), a different conclusion can be drawn from more recent 
research that accounts for different tariffs and circumstances (for comprehensive overviews 
see Faruqui and Sergici, 2010, Newsham and Bowker, 2010, and Quillinan, 2011). For 
example, Newsham and Bowker (2010) highlight the efficacy of such tariffs in pilots and 
conclude that reasonable expectations for peak load reductions are 5% for TOU tariffs and at 
least 30% for CPP tariffs. As Quillian (2011) notes, it seems not so much the question 
whether dynamic tariffs are effective, but how managers can overcome the challenges that 
relate to marketing these tariffs to consumers.  
In line with this notion, the second stream of research takes on a more consumer-oriented 
stance. In an influential article, Faruqui et al. (2010) point to the huge savings potential from 
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smart meters in the EU if only barriers to consumers adopting dynamic tariffs can be 
overcome. In response, an increasing number of articles investigate consumer acceptance of 
dynamic tariffs. Notably, most evidence stems from focus groups, attitudinal surveys and 
pilots (Quillian, 2011). For instance, Paetz et al. (2012) conduct focus group interviews 
indicating that customers recognize the importance of dynamic tariffs are willing to 
“consider” (p. 32) dynamic tariffs in the near future in order to save money, conserve 
electricity, and contribute to environmental benefits. However, more recent research finds that 
consumers are put off by the inherent complexity of highly dynamic tariff types. Dütschke 
and Paetz (2013) conduct a conjoint analysis and find that customers prefer TOU to RTP 
tariffs. Darby and Pisica (2013) analyze material from six focus group find more simple tariffs 
to be preferred. Stenner et al. (2015) conduct a large-scale experimental study with an 
Australian sample and find that consumers prefer the flat rate tariff to all other tariffs and 
simpler tariffs seem to be more attractive. Whereas consumers with higher education or 
renters are more likely to choose a dynamic tariff in general, CPP is most attractive for people 
in lower income classes. An important reason for the preference for simple tariffs is that a 
higher complexity implies a higher perceived risk (Darby and Pisica, 2013; Dütschke and 
Paetz, 2013; Stenner et al., 2015). This notion is in line with Fell et al. (2015) who find that 
trust in the electricity supplier positively increases the attractiveness of dynamic tariffs, 
whereas privacy concerns show the opposite influence. Our study takes a different approach 
and focuses directly on the construct of perceived price complexity.  
 
3. Development of Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
Figure 1 presents our conceptual framework and the analytic steps by which we go forward. 
To motivate our conceptual model, we draw on the behavioral pricing literature that 
contributes to our understanding of consumer evaluations and reactions to different pricing 
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tactics such as price partitioning (e.g., Morwitz et al., 1998; Greenleaf et al., 2016) multi-part 
tariffs (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006; Schlereth and Skiera, 2012), and multi-dimensional 
prices (e.g., Estelami, 1999; 2003), and on the social psychology literature on the three 
primary aspects of thinking (Petty et al., 2002).  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model and analytic procedure. 
3.1 Drivers of Perceived Price Complexity  
Based on an online examination of actual electricity tariffs offered in Germany we expect that 
the complexity of an electricity tariff will be driven by the following antecedents: (1) the tariff 
type as it determines the number of price components above and beyond the connection 
charge, (2) the price ending of the respective consumption-dependent price components, and 
the (3) presentation format of the discount offered to new customers selecting the tariff. All 
these aspects contribute to a more difficult and cognitively demanding information processing 
(Estelami, 1999; 2003; Homburg et al., 2014). It can be argued that these antecedents 
represent an objective form of price complexity that consumers translate in a subjective, 
perceived price complexity.     
With regard to tariff type, we distinguish TOU (i.e., one consumption-dependent price 
component), CPP with an extra rate for the annual hours with maximal load (i.e., two 
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consumption-dependent price component), and RTP where electricity rates alter on an hourly 
basis (in our study, designed as a dynamic tariff with three consumption-dependent price 
components). Hence, to evaluate these dynamic tariffs, consumers need to multiply each 
consumption-dependent price component with an anticipated consumption per time period, 
add the resulting numbers and the connection charge together2. The more consumption-
dependent price components are involved, the higher the cognitive effort. Prior research 
suggests that the number of price components is an important factor in price evaluations 
(Carlson and Weathers, 2008; Feurer et al., 2015; Homburg et al., 2014). With regard to the 
price ending of the respective consumption-dependent price components, prior research shows 
that odd price endings are more difficult to process than even price endings (Choi et al., 2014; 
Estelami, 1999). With regard to the presentation format of the discount offered to new 
customers selecting the tariff, the cognitive effort should be higher for a discount that is 
presented as a percentage of the connection charge (vs. an absolute number) because 
multiplying is more difficult than subtracting (Estelami, 1999). Taken together, we 
hypothesize: 
H1: Tariff type has direct effect on perceived price complexity such that the higher the 
number of consumption-dependent price components the tariff comprises, the higher the 
perceived price complexity.  
H2: Odd price endings of the consumption-dependent price components of a dynamic tariff 
lead to higher perceived price complexity than even price endings. 
H3: If the discount of a dynamic tariff is presented as a percentage, the perceived price 
complexity is higher than when it is presented as an absolute number. 
                                                          
2 This exercise is further complicated by the fact that consumers would require detailed knowledge of the 
household’s load curve. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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As our conceptualization of perceived price complexity bases on the notion of cognitive load, 
we have to acknowledge prior research suggesting that individuals differ not only in their 
ability but also in their opportunity and motivation to process complex information (MacInnis 
et al., 1991). Specifically, need for cognition (NFC) refers to a stable dispositional difference 
in cognitive motivation that is distinguishable from (but related to) intellectual ability 
(Cacioppo and Petty, 1982). High NFC customers have “active, exploring minds and, through 
their senses and intellect, reach and draw out information from their environment” (Cacioppo 
et al., 1996, p. 199). Hence, high-NFC customers enjoy dealing with complex situations while 
low NFC customers are cognitive misers who lack intrinsic cognitive motivation and are thus 
more likely to avoid cognitively strenuous work (Goodman and Irmak, 2013). As a 
consequence, we expect that high (low) NFC individuals are capable of processing more 
(less) complex tariff information before experiencing cognitive overload and hence perceived 
price complexity. We hypothesize: 
H4: NFC moderates the effects proposed in H1-H3 such that the effects are weaker 
(stronger) for individuals high (vs. low) in NFC. 
3.2 Consequences of Perceived Price Complexity  
Prior research suggests that perceived price complexity may have several adverse 
consequences, including reduced perceived transparency of the firm’s pricing and reduced 
price fairness (Carlson and Weathers, 2008; Homburg et al., 2014; Feurer et al., 2015). For 
the present study, we propose that three variables play a central (i.e., mediating) role, linking 
perceived price complexity to behavioral intentions: (1) the extent of heuristic processing, (2) 
perceived bill amount, and (3) thought confidence. These three variables relate to different 
aspects of thinking about an issue that lead to attitude formation and, ultimately, behavior. 
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According to Petty et al. (2002), the social psychology literature emphasizes three primary 
aspects of thinking. We incorporate each of these aspects on thinking about a tariff in our 
model. The first aspect is the extent of thinking which we capture by the depth of information 
processing. We conceptualize this variable to represent a continuum reaching from heuristic 
(“shallow”) processing to systematic (“deep”) processing (Chaiken, 1980). If the information 
processing is systematic, individuals exert considerable cognitive effort to perform the 
evaluation task. If the information processing is heuristic, individuals exert little cognitive 
effort in evaluating a tariff but apply heuristics which “are quite useful, but sometimes they 
lead to severe and systematic errors” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124).  
The second aspect of thinking is content, relating to how favorable or unfavorable the 
thoughts are in response to the thought object. We capture this aspect by the perceived bill 
amount which we define as the subjective monetary burden of a tariff. The inclusion of this 
variable is important because consumers do not always know, encode or estimate an objective 
price correctly (Carlson and Weathers, 2008; Zeithaml, 1988).   
The third aspect of thinking we capture is thought confidence. Thought confidence reflects a 
more meta-cognitive aspect of thinking that relates to individual’s thoughts about their own 
thought processes (Jost et al., 1998; Petty et al., 2002). In line with prior research by Goode et 
al. (2012) and Petty et al. (2002), we define thought confidence as the extent to which a 
person has confidence in their thoughts related to the evaluation of the tariff.  
We expect that perceived price complexity has an effect on all three aspects of consumers’ 
thinking about a dynamic tariff. First, perceived price complexity may determine whether 
consumers engage in systematic or heuristic processing. If the perceived price complexity 
exceeds the consumer’s processing limit, information overload may occur, representing an 
uncomfortable situation (Grisé and Gallupe, 2000). As a result, consumers may reduce this 
cognitive load by applying heuristic processing (Malhotra, 1980; Miller, 1956). When this 
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happens, the consumer will not be able or motivated to calculate the final billing amount. 
Instead, she or he will be more likely to rely on a rough estimate of the costs involved in 
selecting the respective tariff. Indeed, Morwitz et al. (1998) provide evidence that consumers 
apply simple anchoring heuristics when evaluating partitioned prices. In contrast, if the 
perceived price complexity and consequently information load is low, consumers are more 
likely to take all these information into account within an evaluation task and attempt to 
calculate the final bill amount (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Shiffrin and 
Schneider, 1977).  
H5: Perceived price complexity of a dynamic tariff is negatively related to the depth of 
information processing. 
Prior research indicates that the application of heuristics plays a central role in consumers’ 
price judgments (Alba et al., 1999; Morwitz et al., 1998). We hence propose that the depth of 
information processing has an impact on the perceived bill amount. For instance, Morwitz et 
al. (1998) argue that, for partitioned prices, consumer focus on the base price but 
insufficiently adjust for the surcharges. Another heuristic used when evaluating prices is the 
left-digit effect, predicting that consumers focus on the left-most digit of the price and ignore 
the ones that follow, also leading to an underestimation (Thomas et al., 2010). In contrast, 
Carlson and Weathers (2008) observe that for price partitioning with a large number of price 
components, consumers overestimated the total price. As their study design is closest to the 
complexity inherent to dynamic energy tariffs, we expect that heuristic (systematic) 
processing leads to an overestimation (underestimation) of the perceived bill amount. Thus: 
H6a: Depth of information processing is negatively related to the perceived bill amount. 
The depth of information processing itself may also influence consumers thought confidence. 
We expect that a high depth of information processing (i.e., systematic processing) increases 
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thought confidence because consumers are aware that all relevant and potentially important 
price information have been incorporated in the tariff evaluation. Reversely, if the depth of 
information processing is low (i.e., heuristic processing), a consumer may lose faith in his or 
her own ability to evaluate the tariff in an adequate manner (cf. Jacowitz and Kahneman, 
1995). In fact, a consumer may not even be able to name or recognize the heuristic she or he 
applies to evaluate the electricity tariff but still be aware of the fact that heuristic information 
processing is activated (Chen and Chaiken, 1999). Hence: 
H6b: Depth of information processing is positively related to thought confidence. 
The last two hypotheses are rather straightforward. In what is a common consensus in the 
literature, the subjective price is negatively related to perceived value and ultimately behavior 
(e.g., Bornemann and Homburg, 2011; Zeithaml, 1988).  
Also, we expect that thought confidence has a positive effect on behavioral intentions (cf. 
Bennett and Harell, 1975). This notion is in line with Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive 
dissonance. If one has low thought confidence in the own tariff evaluation, this consumer is 
expected to seek to reduce dissonance by leaving the exchange relationship, defer choice or a 
less favorable evaluation, all of which relate to lower behavioral intentions. Similarly, low 
levels of thought confidence imply a certain degree of uncertainty, reducing behavioral 
intentions (cf. Goode et al., 2012; Mitchell, 1999). Hence:  
H7: The perceived costs of a tariff have a negative effect on behavioral intentions. 
H8: The confidence towards the tariff evaluation has a positive effect on behavioral 
intentions. 
 
4. Method 
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4.1 Sample 
We used a commercial consumer panel to recruit a representative sample of German 
consumers to participate in an online experiment. A total of 1,048 completed questionnaires 
were obtained. In a first step, to ensure that all participants read and understood the scenario 
and the following questions well, we excluded 246 participants for obvious speeding and for 
pausing more than six minutes after reading the scenario. In a second step, we excluded 138 
participants for suspicious answering patterns. The resulting effective sample size is 664. The 
sample is representative for the German population in terms of gender, age, education and 
income. Table 1 provides a summary of the sample composition.   
Table 1 
 
Sample Composition.  
 
Characteristic Representative Effective sample 
 distribution distribution 
    
Gender    
Male 49% 51% (341) 
Female 51% 49% (323) 
Age    
18–24 years 10% 8%      (50) 
25–34 years 14% 12% (82) 
35–44 years 19% 19% (123) 
45–54 years 18% 20% (136) 
55–64 years 14% 17% (115) 
65+ years 24% 24% (158) 
Education    
Low 42% 32% (213) 
Medium 29% 33% (220) 
High 28% 35% (231) 
Monthly net income    
Below 1300 Euro 20% 20% (129) 
1300 – 2599 Euro 33% 35% (232) 
2600 – 3599 Euro 18% 18% (122) 
3600 – 4999 Euro 15% 17% (113) 
5000 Euro or more 13% 10% (68)  
 
aEducation was queried throughout seven categories and has been clustered to the three characteristics of low, 
medium and high. Low education includes subjects with secondary modern school qualification or without school 
qualification. Medium education includes subjects with secondary school leaving certificate or vocational school 
qualification. High education includes any kind of university degree as well as high-school diploma. 
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4.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to the 16 treatment conditions of a 4 (Tariff type: 
standard vs. TOU vs. CPP vs. RTP) x 2 (Price endings of consumption-dependent price 
components: odd vs. even) x 2 (discount presentation format: percent vs. absolute) full-
factorial between-subjects design. Note that the tariff type corresponds to the number of 
consumption-dependent price components over and above the monthly connection charge 
(standard = 1 consumption-dependent price components, TOU = 2 pay-per use components, 
CPP = 3 consumption-dependent price components, and RTP = 4 consumption-dependent 
price components). In our experimental setup, the TOU tariff comprises two price 
components for different times of day. The CPP tariff includes a price component that is 
activated in the 100 hours with highest load occurring, and the RTP tariff additionally 
includes a price component that is activated in the 100 hours with highest solar radiation 
occurring.  Table 2 presents the stimuli used in our study. 
Table 2 
Stimuli.      
      
 Treatment condition Consumption-dependent price Period of occurrence New subscriber 
Connection 
Charge 
  components  discounta  
      
Standard tariﬀ 1 29.00 cents/kWh All-day €133 €80 p.a. 
 2 29.43 cents/kWh All-day €148 €80 p.a. 
 3 29.00 cents/kWh All-day 165%b €80 p.a. 
 4 29.43 cents/kWh All-day 185%b €80 p.a. 
TOU tariﬀ 5 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  34.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
 6 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  34.44 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
 7 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
  34.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
 8 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
  34.44 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
CPP tariﬀ 9 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  30.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  90.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
 10 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  30.17 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  94.22 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
 11 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
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  30.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  90.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
 12 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
  30.17 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  94.22 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
RTP tariﬀ 13 26.00 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm €148 €80 p.a. 
  38.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.00 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
 14 25.67 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm €148 €80 p.a. 
  37.95 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.93 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.72 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
 15 26.00 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm 185%b €80 p.a. 
  38.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.00 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
 16 25.67 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm 185%b €80 p.a. 
  37.95 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.93 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.72 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
      
a Tariﬀs 1 and 3 include a new subscriber discount of only €133 due to manipulation reasons. However, testing   
for perceived diﬀerences with an ANOVA showed that subjects did not recognize this diﬀerence (M148€ =4.25 
vs. M133€ =4.38; F(1, 662) =.589, p=.443). 
b The percentage value new subscriber discount refers to the connection charge of €80 p.a. (stated in scenario).  
c This price level is only activated during the 100 hours p.a. with the highest load occurring (stated in scenario).   
d This price level is only activated during the 100 hours p.a. with the highest solar radiation (stated in scenario). 
 
The participants were asked to imagine that they moved to a different city and were now to 
select an energy tariff as a new customer. Subsequently, consumers were presented one of the 
manipulated tariffs from a fictional supplier together with an artificial consumption pattern. 
The supplier name was fictional to avoid reputation influences of the provider (Homburg et 
al., 2014). The artificial consumption pattern was necessary to enable consumers to calculate 
the final billing amount and at the same time control for inter-participant variance in 
consumption. The artificial consumption pattern (see Table 3) was designed such that in all 
experimental conditions, based on the average German household consumption of 3,500 kWh, 
the bill amount added up to about €962 per year. Note that this total amount varies very 
slightly across conditions due to our efforts to construct indisputable manipulations of our 
experimental variables. Still, we argue that all results that will be presented in later sections of 
this article can be attributed to consumer perceptions of price complexity, not on differences 
in the monetary sacrifice of electricity consumption.  
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Table 3 
CONSUMPTION PATTERN   
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION P.A. Kwh 
6 AM – 9 AM  900 
9 AM – 5 PM  600 
5 PM – 10 PM  1500 
10 PM – 6 AM  500 
TOTAL  3500 
 
4.3 Measurement  
Subsequent to the presentation of the scenario and the tariff, participants went on to respond 
to a questionnaire including the focal variables. All latent constructs were measured on seven-
point Likert scales or semantic differentials, using items derived from prior publications in 
top-tier marketing journals. The items were translated into German and adapted to the focal 
context. Additionally, perceived bill amount was measured on a single-item, asking 
participants to indicate the overall bill amount per year. Table 4 provides a summary of the 
measurement as well as the psychometric properties. All multi-item scales were found to be 
unidimensional and to show high convergent validity (see Table 4) and discriminant validity 
on the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; see Table 5).  
Measurement.       
Construct Alpha IR CR AVE M SD 
       
Behavioral intentions (7-point semantic diﬀerential; adopted from Chandran and Morwitz, 2005) .92  .93 .76 3.81 1.28 
Me choosing the VoltStrom tariff is…       
unlikely / likely  .71     
improbable / probable  .87     
unsure / sure  .60     
impossible / possible  .85     
Perceived price complexity (7-point Likert scale; adapted from Homburg et al., 2014; Ittersum et al., 2010) .97  .97 .73 4.22 1.60 
With that many prices, I had a hard time understanding the VoltStrom tariff.  .74     
I would need to know a lot to understand the VoltStrom tariff.  .64     
The VoltStrom tariff looks very complicated to me.  .76     
It was difficult for me to obtain an overview of the price of the VoltStrom tariff.  .83     
It was tough to calculate the total price.  .77     
It was difficult for me to cope with the single numbers.  .74     
I concentrated a lot to carry out the many different calculations.  .57     
To determine the total costs, you need a calculator.  —a     
It was difficult to deal with the VoltStrom tariff.  .87     
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I had to concentrate a lot to evaluate the VoltStrom tariff.  .66     
It took a lot of time to evaluate the VoltStrom tariff and to make a decision.  .68     
I had difficulties to keep an overview of the tariff.  .81     
Depth of information processing (7-point Likert scale; adapted from Novak and Hoﬀman, 2009; reverse coded) .89  .89 .67 4.40 1.40 
I relied on my sense of intuition while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .72     
I trusted my hunches while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .84     
I used my gut feelings while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .81     
I went by what felt good to me.  —a     
I relied on my impressions while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .65     
Perceived bill amount (slider reaching from €0 to €2400) n/a  n/a n/a 1115 110 
Given the consumption pattern, what would be the overall bill amount per year?  n/a     
Thought confidence (7-point semantic diﬀerential; adopted from Keller et al., 2002) .94  .94 .84 4.23 1.38 
How confident/ certain/sure are you that your first estimate is correct?       
not at all confident – completely confident  .81     
not at all certain – completely certain  .87     
not at all sure – completely sure  .84     
Need for cognition (7-point Likert scale adopted from Cotte and Wood, 2004; reverse coded) .81  .81 .52 4.76 1.43 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking 
abilities.  .42     
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I’ll have to think in depth about something.  —a     
I only think as hard as I have to.  .40     
The idea of relying on thought to get my way to the top does not appeal to me.  .66     
The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.  .62     
Domain Specific Involvement (7-point Likert scale taken from Coulter et al., 2003) n/a  n/a n/a 2.87 1.77 
Electricity tariffs fascinate me.       
 
The full survey is available as supplementary online material. 
Table 4 
Construct Correlation and Discriminant Validity 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
1 Need for cognition .695     
2 
Perceived price 
complexity −.450 .854    
3 Depth of information 
processing .214 −.395 .820   
4 Behavioral intentions .024 −.162 −.024 .870  
5 Thought confidence .223 −.487 .311 .325 .915 
6 Perceived costs −.075 .104 −.126 −.099 −.003 n/a 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Analysis of Antecedents of Perceived Price Complexity 
5.1.1 Results 
We analyzed the data using SPSS 23. We start with the manipulation checks for the respective 
predictors. In the questionnaire, respondents answered the question („How many different 
price components per kWh did the tariff comprise depending on the time of consumption?”) 
on a five-point scale. Contrast tests between the four respective tariffs (Standard; TOU, CPP, 
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RTP) indicated that, the number of price components were perceived as significantly distinct 
(MStandard = 2.14 vs. MTOU = 2.45; t = –2.83, p < .01; MTOU = 2.45 vs. MCPP = 2.96; t = –4.65, 
p < .01; MCPP = 2.96 vs. MRTP = 3.23; t = –2.57, p = .01). Thus, the tariff type manipulation 
was successful. Furthermore, participants indicated on a seven-point semantic differential 
with the anchors 1 = “definitely even” and 7 = “definitely odd” that the consumption-
dependent price components were perceived as having different price endings (Meven = 3.27 
vs. Modd = 5.20; F = 186.20, p < .01). Hence, the price ending manipulation was effective in 
the intended direction. Last, participants indicated on a seven-point semantic differential 
anchored 1=“definitely absolute” and 7=“definitely a percentage” that the discount was 
presented in a distinct manner (Mabsolute = 2.30 vs. Mpercent = 5.27; F(1) = 412.05, p < .01). 
Hence, the discount presentation format manipulation was successful. 
Prior to further analysis, we split NFC at the median (4.75). Subsequently, to test H1 to H4, we 
ran a general linear model with perceived price complexity as the dependent variable and 
tariff type, price ending of consumption-dependent price components, discount presentation 
format, and NFC as predictors (F = 4.298, p < .001; Adjusted R² = .134). We found a 
significant main effect of tariff type (F = 7.626, p < .001) that generally supports H1, 
indicating that the perceived price complexity increases with more consumption-dependent 
price components. However, Figure 2 reveals a somewhat more complex pattern. We 
explored this pattern using the Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-Welch F post-hoc test to identify 
homogeneous subsets. The test reveals two distinct subsets (p <. 05), the first including 
standard and TOU, and the second including CPP and RTP of which the latter induces a 
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significantly higher level of perceived price complexity.  
 
Figure 2: Perceived Price Complexity across Tariﬀ Type. Note: Means marked by the same superscripts 
form homogenous subsets based on an R-E-G-W-F post hoc test, indicating that the mean diﬀerences 
are insignificant within, but significant across subsets (p < .05). 
 
 
Secondly, odd (Modd = 4.38) vs. even (Meven = 4.06) price endings of the consumption-
dependent price components contribute to a higher perceived price complexity (F = 7.036, p 
< .01), supporting H2. Thirdly and in support of H3, we observe that the discount presentation 
formatted as a percentage (Mpercent = 4.35) leads to a higher perceived price complexity than 
formatted as an absolute number Mabsolute = 4.09; F = 4.870, p < .05). Last, albeit not 
hypothesized, the main effect of NFC (F = 4.253, p < .001) was negative and significant, 
suggesting that individuals high in NFC have generally a lower perception of price 
complexity than their low NFC counterparts.  
Turning to the moderating effects, we find a significant tariff type × NFC interaction effect 
(F = 5.799, p = .001). As Figure 3 depicts, the effect of tariff type depends on whether 
participants are high or low in NFC. However, the moderation is somewhat different to what 
we expected. Whereas low NFC individuals seem to generally perceive all tariffs as relatively 
high in price complexity, consumers high in NFC perceive the price complexity of the 
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standard and TOU tariff to be lower than the CPP and RTP tariffs. Hence, the effect of tariff 
type is stronger for high NFC than for low NFC individuals. The same post-hoc test as before 
was performed separately for the high NFC and low NFC subsamples. In case of low NFC, all 
tariff types form one subset in which price complexity does not differ significantly. In case of 
high NFC, we see two subset (standard and TOU; CPP and RTP) for which price complexity 
differs across, but not within. All other interaction terms involving NFC are not significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Still, H4 is not supported. 
Furthermore, albeit not hypothesized, we find a significant price ending × discount 
presentation format interaction (F = 4.253, p < .05), suggesting that the positive effect of 
percent (vs. absolute) discount presentation format on price complexity appears in cases of 
even, but not odd price endings. The interaction is depicted in Figure 4. All other two-way, 
three-way, and four-way interactions were not significant. 
 
 
Figure 3: Tariﬀ Type × NFC Interaction Eﬀect. Note: Means marked by the same 
superscripts form homogenous subsets based on an R-E-G-W-F post hoc test, 
indicating that the mean diﬀerences are insignificant within, but significant 
across subsets (p < .05). The tests are conducted separately for the respective 
low/high-NFC subsamples. 
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5.1.2 
Discussion 
With the exception of H4, the data lends support to our rational that the focal characteristics of 
dynamic tariffs leads to an increase in perceived price complexity. As Figure 2 and 3 depict, 
the tariff type plays a central role in the perception of price complexity. Specifically, we see 
that CPP and RTP are perceived more complex than the standard and TOU tariffs. We believe 
that this step-like effect can be explained by the somewhat different nature of the former tariff 
subset, featuring price components that become effective in peak-load times for which 
occurrence is hard to anticipate by consumers. This additional cognitive effort then translates 
into a higher price complexity.  
Even though the nature of the tariff type × NFC interaction is different to what we 
hypothesized, it adds to our understanding of how different consumer segments perceive 
dynamic tariffs. We expected that cognitive effort-inducing variations in tariff design would 
to a smaller extent translate into perceived price complexity for high NFC consumers. 
Intriguingly, we observe that low NFC consumers perceive high levels of price complexity for 
all tariff types. This pattern allows for the interpretation that low NFC consumers, the 
introduction of the presumably more complex dynamic tariffs cannot make matters much 
more effortful. This finding is consistent with consumers’ concerns expressed in focus group 
Figure 4: Price Endings of Consumption-dependent Price Components × 
Discount Presentation Format Interaction. 
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interviews that “tariffs may become even more complex than they currently are” (Darby and 
Pisica, 2013; p. 2329, italics added).  
The interaction of price endings of consumption-dependent price components and discount 
presentation format (Figure 4) is unexpected. Specifically, we observe only a difference in 
perceived price complexity due to a variation of price endings when the discount is framed as 
an absolute number, but not when it is framed as a percentage. A possible interpretation is that 
the presence of a percentage number is so salient and effort-inducing that consumers do no 
more focus on price endings. In this way, this interaction speaks for the possibility of a ceiling 
effect such that at some point, it requires a very substantial increase in cognitive effort to 
further increase price complexity. This conclusion can also be drawn from Figure 2 and 3. 
5.2 Analysis of Consequences of Perceived Price Complexity 
5.2.1 Results 
To investigate the consequences of perceived price complexity we carried out a structural 
equation model (SEM) using AMOS 23. All fit indices were in line with the recommended 
cutoff-values indicating good fit of the model with the data (χ²/df = 2.658; GFI = .927; AGFI 
= .908; CFI = .975; RMSEA = .050). We report standardized path coefficients. 
The results show that perceived price complexity has a negative impact on the depth of 
information processing (β = –.395, p < .001), supporting H5. As hypothesized in H6a and H6b, 
depth of information processing has a negative effect on perceived bill amount (β = –.102, 
p < .05) and a positive effect on thought confidence (β = .140, p < .001), respectively. The 
effect of the perceived bill amount on behavioral intentions was negative and significant 
(β = –.089, p < .05), supporting H7. Furthermore, thought confidence has a positive effect on 
behavioral intentions (β = .345, p < .001), supporting H8. 
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We also assessed whether depth of information processing, perceived bill amount and thought 
confidence serve as partial or full mediators in the causal chain we propose. The direct effect 
of perceived price complexity on perceived bill amount is insignificant (β = .062, p > .10), 
lending support for the key role of depth of information processing. However, perceived price 
complexity has a significant and negative direct effect on thought confidence (β = –.432, 
p < .001), suggesting that depth of information processing partially mediates the perceived 
price complexity-thought confidence link. However, the direct path between perceived price 
complexity and behavioral intentions is not significant (β = –.049, p > .10). Last, we observe a 
negative and significant direct effect of depth of information processing on behavioral 
intentions (β = –.162, p < .001), suggesting that the effect of depth of information processing 
on behavioral intentions is partially mediated by perceived bill amount and thought 
confidence.  
Taken together, we conclude that depth of information processing, perceived bill amount, and 
thought confidence are the critical constructs linking perceived price complexity with 
behavioral intentions. The results of the SEM appear in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Discussion 
Before discussing the results from our SEM, it is worth taking a step back and recapitulate the 
early point we made with regard to the unique context of decision-making for consumers 
Figure 5. Structural Results of Consequences of Perceived Price Complexity.  
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when choosing between energy tariffs. To motivate the examination of depth of information 
processing, we argued that, albeit highly relevant for everyone, the focal category evokes only 
very little consumer involvement. As a consequence, we expected that despite the substantial 
monetary sacrifice (€962), many consumers would lack the motivation to engage in 
systematic processing once the level of perceived price complexity increases. To support this 
reasoning, we included a single-item scale for domain specific consumer involvement in our 
questionnaire (“Electricity tariffs fascinate me”). On a scale anchored 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much so) the mean in our representative sample was 2.87 (SD=1.77) and the median was even 
lower (2.0). This finding reinforces the challenge energy provides and policymakers face 
when promoting dynamic tariffs in Europe. 
In this context, depth of information processing, perceived bill amount and thought 
confidence play important roles in the consumers’ tariff evaluation process. As the SEM 
reveals, our hypotheses H5-H8 are supported. The perception of price complexity first and 
foremost leads to a decrease in depth of information processing, that is, the likelihood with 
which consumers apply heuristic processing increases. A so reduced depth of information 
processing has a twofold effect: the perceived bill amount increases and the thought 
confidence decreases, both resulting in lower behavioral intentions. It is also worth noting 
that, across all tariffs, consumers on average over-estimate the annual bill amount 
(M = €1.115, SD = €110) by about €150 or 15.9%. This is interesting because seminal 
research on price partitioning suggests the application of an anchoring heuristic in which the 
connection charge is used as an anchor that is only insufficiently upward adjusted for the 
other price components (Morwitz et al., 1998). It could be that in the realm of dynamic tariffs, 
the connection charge is not perceived as a base price because it contributes relatively little to 
the final bill amount and hence other price components may be more salient.    
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The SEM also reveals that the direct path between perceived price complexity and behavioral 
intentions is not significant, suggesting that the effect is fully mediated by the proposed three 
mediators. At closer examination of the proposed causal chain, however, we find that the 
unhypothesized relations between perceived price complexity and thought confidence and 
between depth of information processing and behavioral intentions are both negative and 
significant. Concerning the former, perceived price complexity apparently decreases thought 
confidence by a mechanism other than depth of information processing that is not included in 
our model. It is possible that consumers who experience price complexity fear to be “nickel-
and-dimed“ by the tariff provider and lose faith in their evaluation as a result (Carlson and 
Weathers, 2008, p. 725). It is also possible that the prospect of behavior change to reduce the 
bill amount has such an effect, an aspect that is not focus of our research. Concerning the 
latter, one could speculate that a higher depth of information processing increases consumers’ 
awareness for the overall cost of electricity per year. Furthermore, higher depth of information 
processing may increase consumers’ cost of thinking (Shugan, 1980) which may decrease 
behavioral intention by a reduced price fairness (Feurer et al., 2015). Clearly, more research is 
necessary to understand this relationship. Apart from the data suggesting partial mediations in 
two cases, the effect of price complexity on perceived bill amount is fully mediated by depth 
of information processing.  
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
6.1 Contributions  
In many countries across the globe, decarbonization efforts are getting off the ground and the 
share of fluctuating, renewable-based electricity generation is increasing significantly. 
However, shifts from nuclear and fossil energy sources to renewables bear the challenge of a 
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better alignment of energy production and consumption. Researchers agree that dynamic 
tariffs may be an important piece in the puzzle, but residential consumers show adverse 
reactions to their inherent price complexity (e.g., Breukers and Mourik, 2013; Dütschke and 
Paetz, 2013). As in Europe these tariffs are offered as opt-in options only, their success 
ultimately depends on consumers selecting them.  
In response, the overarching goal of this research was to better understand how consumers’ 
perceptions of price complexity are formed and by which processes price complexity in turn 
shapes behavioral intentions to select a dynamic tariff. Using a large and representative 
sample of German consumers, our research identifies tariff type, price endings of the 
consumption-dependent price components and the discount presentation format as well as 
NFC as important drivers of perceived price complexity. Depth of information processing as 
well as perceived bill amount and thought confidence are important variables that mediate the 
effect of perceived price complexity on behavioral intentions. 
In revealing these relationships, our research provides several contributions. First, our 
research bridges literature streams from several disciplines and demonstrates how an 
interdisciplinary approach can provide valuable insights into dynamic tariff-choice behavior. 
In so doing, we contribute to the growing literature on consumer reactions to dynamic tariffs 
in the realm of DSM (e.g., Dupont et al., 2014; Grünewald et al., 2015; Salies, 2013). 
Specifically, by illuminating the decision-making process, we add to the young literature 
stream that specifically takes on a consumer perspective (e.g., Darby and Pisica, 2013; 
Dupont et al., 2014; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Stenner et al., 2015). While this research 
acknowledges that a tariff should be simple, “most of the evidence comes from focus groups, 
attitudinal survey and pilots” (Quillinan, 2011, p. 547). With our study, we illuminate how 
price complexity and cognitive burden affect the decision-making process.  
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Secondly, we advance the literature on price complexity (e.g., Homburg et al., 2014; Feurer et 
al., 2015), that is still in its infancy, and on price partitioning (Carlin, 2009; Greenleaf et al., 
2016; Morwitz et al., 1998). For example, while Greenleaf at al. (2016) acknowledge that 
pricing schemes “have become more complex and sophisticated, often making [the price] 
more difficult for consumers to accurately process” (p. 107), traditional price partitioning 
research focuses on simple base-price-and-surcharge situations. Specifically, our research 
adds to the price complexity and price partitioning literature by examining the special context 
of dynamic energy tariffs in which prices are highly complex, and the salience of the base 
price (i.e., connection charge) and of consumer involvement is low. In doing so, we also add 
to the literature that examines behavioral effects of complex tariff structures (e.g., Lambrecht 
and Skiera, 2006).     
6.2 Limitations  
We acknowledge that our research has several limitations that provide avenues for further 
research. First, our unit of analysis is the individual consumer. While it is possible that in 
many households the decision for an energy tariff is made by one single individual, prior 
research assumes a joint decision-making process in many cases (Gottwalt et al., 2011; 
Wilson and Dowladabadi, 2007). Future research should consider a joint decision-making 
process and illuminate how this process is affected by differences in family role structure and 
different decision strategies (Ashraf, 2009; Davis, 1976). 
Secondly, this study is limited by several issues that arise from the nature of our experimental 
design and procedure. As it is extremely difficult in Europe to observe actual electricity tariff 
choice behavior in the realm of a field experiment, we relied on a scenario experiment with 
behavioral intentions rather than actualized behavior as a dependent variable. As such, 
participants stated preferences in an artificial tariff choice situation. In real life, consumers 
might be willing to invest more cognitive effort in the evaluation of a dynamic tariff.  
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6.3 Implications  
The results of our empirical study yield several implications. First and foremost, policymakers 
and managers of power suppliers need to understand that the requirement to offer dynamics as 
opt-in options has upgraded residential consumers to be a critical factor. If consumers cannot 
be convinced to select these tariffs, their potential to contribute to successful decarbonization 
is likely to be untapped. Hence, tariff design is no longer only means to the end of price 
discrimination to maximize profits in the light of heterogeneous demand. Rather, managers 
responsible for dynamic tariff design must take into account why and which consumers react 
adversely to such tariffs. Our research helps to understand the psychological processes by 
which consumer perceive and react to the complexity these tariffs imply.  
When designing dynamic tariffs, managers should first and foremost try to limit perceived 
price complexity for consumers in ways possible, for instance, by offering absolute discounts 
and even price endings where possible. Given the increased level of perceived price 
complexity for tariffs that feature price components that become effective in peak-load times, 
special caution is required. At the same time, if such a tariff is to be offered, the non-linear 
increase in complexity provides some room for even more complex tariffs because the 
objective increase in complexity does not lead consumers to perceive price complexity over 
and above the extent they already do.    
Secondly, tariff design should take into account the special role of NFC. Different tariffs 
should be offered and communicated such that they meet the tastes of high and low NFC 
consumers, respectively. Simple TOU tariffs with two consumption-dependent price 
components could be targeted at high NFC consumers specifically as they are not perceived 
as more complex than the standard tariff. For those consumers lacking the motivation to 
process and/or at higher levels of price complexity, two alternatives seem feasible: First, 
measures could be taken to reduce the cognitive burden (e.g., offering a function on the 
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website that calculates the total bill amount) or to increase consumer involvement and 
ultimately cognitive motivation (e.g., gamification). Finally, it may be possible to target CPP 
and RTP tariffs at low NFC consumers, utilizing the fact that they perceive all electricity 
tariffs as rather complex in any case. 
6.4 Further Research 
Even though our experimental approach is quasi-standard in marketing research (Bemmaor, 
1995), it would be desirable for future research to validate our results by observing real tariff 
choice behavior. Furthermore, in order to design a valid manipulation, it was necessary to 
provide participants with an artificial consumption pattern. However, due to a low 
involvement, consumers may in reality not know about their consumption or may find it 
difficult to predict their (future) consumption given a particular tariff (Goodman and Irmak, 
2013; Nunes, 2000). Future research should investigate the role this difficulty plays for the 
evaluation of dynamic tariffs.  
More work also needs to be done to understand which factors lead consumers to overestimate 
or underestimate the total cost of electricity tariffs. Our research suggests that consumers 
frequently apply heuristics when evaluating dynamic tariffs but does not illuminate which 
heuristics were applied.   
Last, as always, future research needs to ensure generalizability by replicating and extending 
our findings with different samples and differently designed dynamic tariffs. 
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